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Abstract
In this paper, we evaluate the recent developments of European climate policy
from the perspective of the 2050 European commitments with regards to GHG
emissions reduction. We use a non-cooperative meta-game approach for assess-
ing European burden-sharing issues. We analyze the European Effort Sharing
Decision proposed in July 2016 and evaluate its cost per member states. We sim-
ulate several other policy options regarding this sharing decision with the aim to
stress the main policy implications of the new proposal. Considering the Brexit
referendum that took place June 23, 2016 in the United Kingdom, we analyze dif-
ferent possible scenarios of British participation in European climate policy. We
show that Brexit could have a significant negative impact on the United Kingdom’s
climate-policy cost and a relatively positive effect on the remaining twenty-seven
EU member states.
Keywords: Effort Sharing Decision, Brexit, European Union, Climate policy,
Game theory
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we provide an economic assessment
of the EU burden-sharing rule recently submitted by the European Commission
(EC), and we discuss the fairness issues associated with this rule. Second, we
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analyze the potential impact of the UK Brexit decision on the EU climate policy
and the burden-sharing agreements.
In July 2016, the EC presented its proposal for a regulation to reduce GHG
emissions in sectors not covered by the emissions trading system (ETS) with
regards to post-2020 binding targets (European Commission, 2016). The pro-
posal defines a new burden-sharing framework, called the Effort Sharing Deci-
sion (ESD), and proposes several new features of the European framework aimed
at limiting GHG emissions. Unfortunately, the impact assessment done by the
commission does not provide the welfare implication per member states (MS) of
this new regulation even though the models used for this assessment (Primes and
GEM-E3) allow for such an evaluation (Capros et al., 2011). Hence, the first goal
of this paper is to analyze the EU burden-sharing rule in the context of 2050 Euro-
pean climate targets, which imply a reduction of GHG emissions by at least 80%
domestically by 2050 as compared to 1990 levels (CEC, 2011a). We will evalu-
ate MS welfare impacts for this new EU proposal and compare them with those
occurring in some possible alternative rules.
In June 2016, the UK voted to leave the European Union (EU) (Menon and
Salter, 2016) and, as a consequence, a number of European policies need to be
revised. Among them, we find, of course, the European climate policy with com-
mitments and economic instruments that are already in effect, such as the EU ETS
(Anderson et al., 2016), the ESD discussed above and the upcoming pledges sub-
mitted recently at COP21 (Rogelj et al., 2015; United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, 2016a). At COP21, the EU MS adopted a binding
target of at least a 40% reduction in domestic GHG emissions by 2030 compared
to 1990. Brexit will force EU to reconsider the ESD without the UK participation.
Thus, the second objective of this paper will analyze the impact of a hard Brexit on
the European climate policy. For that purpose we will use the fair burden-sharing
model for Europe, already introduced in Babonneau et al. (2016).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the burden-sharing
model used for assessing the welfare implications of the EU ESD and explains
how the Brexit component is taken into consideration in our game theoretical
approach. Section 3 discusses implementation issues such as the calibration of the
payoff functions and the reference scenario. In Section 4, we provide an economic
assessment of the recent ESD and of the possible impacts of a hard Brexit on the
long-term European climate policy. Eventually, Section 5 concludes our analysis.
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2. A model to assess EU28 burden-sharing
In the literature, the design of climate agreements is usually the result of a
fully normative approach in which a benevolent planner (e.g., EC) completely
organizes the international permit trading system. This approach determines the
emissions budget share given to each country and decides how much of this share
is allocated per period by region. These types of approaches entirely bypass the
possibility for each country to strategically exploit its share of the cumulative
emission budget, even though this aspect of the policy is explicitly addressed in
the recent EC proposal on burden-sharing (European Commission, 2016). Re-
cently, a dynamic game model has been proposed in Babonneau et al. (2016) to
represent the non-cooperative timing strategies of EU countries in the exploitation
of their respective emissions budget share. In this game, the players are the 28 EU
countries. The strategies are the supply schedules of emission rights on the Eu-
ropean carbon market, and the payoffs are the discounted sums of welfare gains
(or losses). A coupled constraint on the emission budget is imposed. The game
has, therefore, a two-level structure. At the lower level, a competitive carbon mar-
ket defines carbon prices and emission levels for each country based on the total
emission rights supply. At the higher level, each country decides, for each period,
its own emission rights supply, considering the share of global cumulative emis-
sion budget it has received. A first version of the model, using a game theoretic
approach, has been proposed in Babonneau et al. (2013) and Haurie et al. (2014)
to analyze a fair distribution of effort among twelve coalitions of countries world-
wide. The same approach has been used in Babonneau et al. (2016) to assess the
EU climate policy.
2.1. The European burden-sharing model
For the sake of clarity, let us recall the mathematical formulation of the Eu-
ropean burden-sharing game proposed in Babonneau et al. (2016). There are
m countries indexed j = 1, . . . ,m, that generate emissions etj on periods t ∈
{0, 1, . . . , T − 1}. The model assumes:
1. A competitive market for emission permits, which clears at each period,
denoting ωtj the supply of permits by country j at period t. Then, Ω
t =∑m
j=1 ω
t
j is the total supply of permits on the market at period t and p
t(Ωt)
the clearing permit price at period t.
2. A cumulative emissions budget denoted Bud imposes a limit on cumu-
lative emissions from all countries over the T periods. This budget is dis-
tributed among the players. Let θj ∈ [0, 1] be the share of player j, with
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∑m
j=1 θj = 1. The θ parameters are thus design variables that will change
the game structure, and, therefore, the equilibrium solution.
In the proposed information structure, each player (country) j defines for itself
a permit supply schedule (ωtj : t = 0, . . . , T − 1). The total supply of permits on
the market at period t is Ωt =
∑m
j=1 ω
t
j . The payoff of player j at equilibrium
satisfies :
max
ωj
{
T−1∑
t=0
βtj(pi
t
j(e
t
j(Ω
t)) + pt(Ωt)(ωtj − etj(Ωt)))
}
, (1)
subject to actions chosen by the other players and under the budget-sharing
constraint
T−1∑
t=0
ωtj ≤ θjBud. (2)
Here βtj is a discount rate (equal to 5%), and pi
t
j(e
t
j) represents the economic ben-
efits obtained from emissions by country j at time t. One assumes positive dimin-
ishing marginal returns, i.e. pitj
′
(etj) > 0 and pi
t
j
′′
(etj) < 0.
We assume a competitive market for emission permits that clears at each pe-
riod. Given a price pt, each country chooses emissions to achieve
max
ej
{
pitj(e
t
j) + p
t(ωtj − etj(Ωt))
}
.
Equilibrium conditions of profit maximization and market clearing are then
pitj
′
(etj) = p
t, t = 0, . . . , T − 1; j = 1, . . . ,m, (3)
Ωt =
m∑
j=1
etj, t = 0, . . . , T − 1. (4)
Note that compared to the existing EU climate-policy architecture, the game
structure proposed here assumes implicitly that EU ETS is extended to non-ETS
sectors. This assumption is consistent with the scenario “one-off flexibility” cur-
rently debated in the new regulation (European Commission, 2016) related to the
post-2020 binding target. In this scenario, one aims at facilitating the access to
EU ETS for MS with a national emissions-reduction target significantly above
both the EU average target and their cost-effective reduction potential. Moreover,
the banking and borrowing option that is assumed in the game is also considered
in the same document through inter-temporal flexibility. Our assumption is that
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with increasing abatements the need for equalization of carbon prices between
ETS and non-ETS sectors should become a crucial issue (Tol, 2009).
This system implicitly defines after-trade equilibrium emissions, etj(Ω
t), and
the permit price, pt(Ωt). By differentiating (3) and (4) we can compute the deriva-
tives
pt
′
(Ωt) =
1∑m
j=1
1
pitj
′′(etj(Ωt))
(5)
etj
′
(Ωt) =
1∑m
i=1
pitj
′′(etj(Ωt))
piti
′′(eti(Ωt))
. (6)
Applying the standard Kuhn-Tucker multiplier method, with multipliers νj , we
obtain the following first-order necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium
νj = β
t
j(p
t(Ωt) + pt
′
(Ωt)(ωtj − etj(Ωt))) (7)
t = 0, . . . , T − 1; j = 1, . . . ,m.
0 = νj(θjBud−
T−1∑
t=0
ωtj) (8)
0 ≤ θjBud−
T−1∑
t=0
ωtj (9)
0 ≤ νj. (10)
Negotiations could then focus on the design of the budget-sharing scheme,
i.e., finding the proportions θj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,m of the budget allocated to each
country, satisfying
∑m
j=1 θj = 1.
2.2. Taking Brexit into account
Let us explain how Brexit is taken into consideration in this game theoretic
analysis.
2.2.1. The current UK situation within EU
In 2014, according to UNFCCC inventory1 (United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, 2016b), the UK was the second-largest European
1GHG emissions with LULUCF.
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GHG emitter, with 518 Mt CO2-eq emitted, representing 13.1% of EU28 emis-
sions. As highlighted by Pye et al. (2015), the UK was the first G20 country to
adopt legislation on GHG emissions. In 2000, the British government launched
the country’s Climate Change Programme, with the aim of achieving not only the
GHG emissions defined within the Kyoto Protocol but to go beyond this goal by
emitting 20% less carbon dioxide than in 1990 in 2010. The Climate Change
Programme introduced several economic instruments, e.g., a climate-change levy,
an energy-efficiency improvement program, and a UK Emissions Trading Scheme
(UK ETS). The UK ETS was the first national, multi-sector CO2 emissions trading
program ever implemented (Smith and Swierzbinski, 2007; Dahan et al., 2015). In
2008, the Climate Change Act (United Kingdom Government, 2008) established
a mandate of an 80% cut in GHG emissions by 2050. Since 2007, the UK has
participated in the EU ETS, a central pillar of EU climate policy and the first cap-
and-trade system dedicated to carbon emissions implemented at an international
level. The EU ETS was inspired by the UK ETS. The EU ETS applies to all 28
EU MSs and to three of the four partners of the European Free Trade Association
(Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein). The ETS covers 45% of EU GHG emis-
sions and more than 11,000 energy-intensive plants from power generation and
manufacturing industries. According to the UK government about 1,000 power
stations and industrial plants in the UK participate in the EU ETS.
2.2.2. The situation after Brexit
After Brexit, the UK should effectively continue its transition to a low-carbon
economy as pointed out by Lord Nicholas Stern: “The UK’s commitment on cli-
mate change is longstanding and based on a understanding that it is global issue
and should not be altered by its future departure from the European Union”2.
Further, it seems very unlikely that the UK would revise its international climate
change commitments (Scott, 2016).
We assume in our analysis a hard Brexit, meaning that the UK cannot par-
ticipate any more to the EU game. the UK timing strategy is represented by the
following domestic model:
2Lord Stern responds to speech by the UK Secretary of State for Energy and Climate
Change Amber Rudd, see http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/news/lord-stern-responds-to-
speech-by-amber-rudd/
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Figure 1: Share of CO2 emissions per MS in 2014. Source:United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (2016b) (Other high income MSs: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland,
Netherlands, and Sweden).
max
euk
{
T−1∑
t=0
βtukpi
t
uk(e
t
uk)
}
, (11)
subject to UK budget constraint
T−1∑
t=0
etuk ≤ Buduk. (12)
The UK’s CO2 target is implemented domestically through a domestic carbon
price, without any access to the EU emissions trading system. Other European
countries continue to participate in the European climate framework with a re-
duced budget from which the UK emissions budget has been subtracted, i.e. Bud-
Buduk.
3. Identification of welfare losses
In this section, we discusse the implementation issues of the European burden-
sharing model described above.
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3.1. Payoffs
To identify the payoff functions of the game defined above we apply regression
analysis based on an ensemble of 200 numerical simulations of different possible
European climate-policy scenarios performed with GEMINI-E3. In each scenario,
we assume a carbon tax is implemented at the European level without emissions
trading and we suppose only carbon emissions are taxed. We computed the fol-
lowing (undiscounted) values for each country and each time period:
• The abatement level relative to the reference emissions (e¯tj) expressed in a
million tons of carbon; The abatement is thus defined by e¯tj − etj
• The welfare cost measured by household surplus, and represented by the
compensating variation of income (CVI) expressed in $ (see Bernard and
Vielle (2003) for details);
• The gains in the terms of trade (GTT) representing spill-over effects due to
changes in international prices. In a climate change policy these GTTs come
mainly from the drop in fossil energy prices that result from the decrease of
world energy demand. The GTTs are expressed in US$.
We obtain the abatement cost (AC) by subtracting the GTT from the surplus,
which defines the deadweight loss of taxation, i.e., the domestic cost that would
occur in a closed economy and that depends only on abatement done within the
country. The GTT represents the imported cost (negative for energy-exporting
countries and positive for net energy-importing countries such as European coun-
tries). This imported cost or benefit is a function of the global EU carbon abate-
ment.
Using regression analysis3, one estimates the parameters α1j (t), α
2
j (t), α
3
j (t)
and α4j (t) in a polynomial of degree 4 describing the abatement cost AC
t
j(e
t
j) of
player j at period t, as a function of the abatement level. To maintain convexity
of the cost function, the regression analysis is done under constraints ACtj
′
(·) ≥ 0
and ACtj
′′
(·) ≥ 0.
ACtj(e
t
j) = α
1
j (t) (e¯
t
j− etj) +α2j (t) (e¯tj− etj)2 +α3j (t) (e¯tj− etj)3 +α4j (t) (e¯tj− etj)4.
(13)
The 10-year time periods (t) are 2020, 2030, 2040, 2050.
3All estimators (αkj (t) and µj(t)) including standard deviations are available upon request.
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Figure 2 presents the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves (i.e. the deriva-
tive of the abatement cost function with respect to the abatement) for main Euro-
pean countries estimated for the year 2030. It shows where it is the cheapest to
abate carbon emissions (Poland, Germany, Spain, and new MSs) and where it is
the most expensive (France, Italy, and other high-income MSs). The UK (black
curve) is part of the first group.
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Figure 2: Marginal abatement cost function in 2030 in US$ per ton of CO2 wrt to percentage of
CO2 emissions reduction
The GTT of player j is assumed to be a linear function of the EU abatement
in a given period
GTT tj (e
t
j) = µj(t)
∑
i
(e¯ti − eti), j = 1, . . . ,m, (14)
and the parameters µj(t) are also estimated from the GEMINI-E3 runs. Using
these definitions, the economic benefits pitj(.) introduced in (1) is defined as the
opposite of welfare loss induced by abatement
pitj(e
t
j) = GTT
t
j (e
t
j)− ACtj(etj), j = 1, . . . ,m. (15)
3.2. The GEMINI-E3 reference scenario
The GEMINI-E3 reference scenario is built on the time period of 2007-2050
with yearly timesteps; all prices given in this paper are in 2007 US$. Assump-
tions on population and GDP are based on joint work of the Economic Policy
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Committee and the European Commission (DG ECFIN) published in 2011 (CEC,
2011b). This work supposes European GDP will grow by 1.6% per year between
2010-2050. Evolution of energy prices is based on assumptions from the current
policies scenario of the World Energy Outlook 2013 of the International Energy
Agency (International Energy Agency, 2013). It is assumed that in 2050 the price
of oil will reach $162, the price of imported gas in Europe will be equal to $15.6
per Mbtu and the price of steam coal imported to OECD countries will reach $125
per ton.
Note that in this reference scenario, no climate policy is implemented. This
will serve to evaluate the burden of implementing the European climate policy
for each participating country, considering the 2050 target and existing 2020 ob-
jectives. Our reference is consistent with the “no-policy baseline scenario” per-
formed within the EMF28 project (Knopf et al., 2013), in which most of the mod-
els suggest a more modest CO2 emissions increase. Our emissions will generate
a cumulative emissions budget of 173 Gt CO2 over the period 2011-2050. Ac-
cording to EC (CEC, 2011b), the UK’s GDP will grow at 1.9% per annum from
2015 to 2050. This assumption does not consider any possible negative economic
impact caused by Brexit (Kierzenkowski et al., 2016; PricewaterhouseCoopers,
2016). In our reference scenario, the UK’s CO2 emissions grow at an annual rate
of 0.7% and represent, during the period from 2011-2050, 14% of EU28 CO2
emissions.
4. Economic assessment of the effort sharing decision and Brexit
In this section, we first design and assess different EU burden-sharing agree-
ments up to 2050 based on recent propositions of the EU Commission and we
compare these agreements with a more equitable burden-sharing in which relative
contributions are equalized. Second we evaluate the potential economic impacts
of the recent Brexit decision on the long-term EU climate policy, assuming a com-
plete and hard leave of the UK. All detailed results of the scenarios discussed in
this section are reported in appendices A.1 and A.2.
In all following simulations, we focus on the period 2011-2050 and we constrain
MS to satisfy an EU emissions budget during that period that is compatible with
the pathway associated with an 80% reduction by 2050. In this paper, we consider
only CO2 emissions from energy combustion. According to Babonneau et al.
(2016), this budget is estimated to 99 Gt CO2 whose 13.7 Gt CO2 is for the UK.
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4.1. EU burden-sharing scenarios
Let us first define three burden-sharing scenarios for the period 2011-2050
partly by extending up to 2050 the so-called “Effort Sharing Decision” (ESD)
proposed recently by the EU commission. The scenarios then differ in how they
combine European Trading Scheme (ETS) and non-ETS mechanisms in a unified
EU carbon permit scheme. Let us now describe and justify the generation of these
scenarios in-more depth.
The “Energy–Climate” directive adopted in 2008 divided the European econ-
omy into two parts (Bo¨hringer, 2014; Bo¨hringer et al., 2009): (i) sectors sub-
ject to the European trading scheme (ETS) were chosen from those most energy-
intensive (primarily electricity generation), and (ii) all other sectors (non-ETS),
including the fossil energy consumption of households. The ETS is an exchange
tradable permits market for firms, characterized by one CO2 price (Venmans,
2012). The allocation of allowances is mainly based on free allowances with some
auctioning. However, in the future, it is planned that auctioning will become the
default method (Hepburn et al., 2006). For the non-ETS market, CO2 abatement
objectives are based on the so called ”Effort Sharing Decision“ (ESD).
The ESD sets GHG emissions targets for MSs according to their economic
capacity on the basis of their relative wealth measured by GDP per capita. Two
rounds of ESD were already defined, one for the year 2020 adopted in 2007 and
the other one recently proposed for the year 2030 (European Commission, 2016).
Table 1 shows these two ESDs, and figure 3 plots the GHG abatement target with
respect to GDP per capita for each MS. The relation between the GHG target
and wealth can be approximated accurately by a polynomial function as shown
in figure 3 (ESD 2020 and ESD 2030). For our analysis, we replicate the same
rule for the all periods (i.e., 2011-2050) and apply the same trend. We define an
aggregate CO2 emissions reduction for the whole period equal to 43%, i.e., (173-
99)/173, and allocate this target to MS, using the same polynomial function with
a constant term adjusted to fit the requested CO2 aggregated emissions reduction.
This burden-sharing is presented in the last column of table 1 and in the figure 3
through a black line. Our ESD corresponds to a downward translation with respect
to the 2030 ESD.
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Table 1: Effort-sharing decision
GDP per capita ESD target 2020 ESD target 2030 ESD target 2011-2050
year 2013 in % of 2005 levels in % of 2011-2050
Source: European Commission (2016) emissions
Bulgaria 5800 20% 0% -14%
Romania 7200 19% -2% -16%
Croatia 10200 11% -7% -20%
Hungary 10200 10% -7% -20%
Poland 10200 14% -7% -20%
Latvia 11300 17% -6% -22%
Lithuania 11800 15% -9% -23%
Slovakia 13600 13% -12% -26%
Estonia 14400 11% -13% -27%
Czech Republic 14900 9% -14% -28%
Portugal 16300 1% -17% -30%
Greece 16500 -4% -16% -31%
Slovenia 17400 4% -15% -32%
Malta 18100 5% -19% -33%
Cyprus 21000 -5% -24% -37%
Spain 22100 -10% -26% -39%
Italy 26500 -13% -33% -45%
United Kingdom 31900 -16% -36% -50%
France 32100 -14% -36% -50%
Germany 35000 -14% -37% -52%
Belgium 35400 -15% -38% -52%
Finland 37400 -16% -39% -53%
Austria 38100 -16% -39% -53%
Netherlands 38700 -16% -39% -54%
Ireland 39000 -20% -39% -54%
Sweden 45400 -17% -40% -54%
Denmark 45500 -20% -40% -54%
Luxembourg 85600 -20% -40% -54%
European Union (28) 26700 -10% -30% -43%
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Figure 3: Effort-sharing target for year 2020 and 2030 and the period 2011-2050
First, we simulate a scenario using the burden-sharing defined above applied
to all CO2 emissions (ETS and non ETS). This scenario is called full ESD. The
welfare changes are reported in table 2. The full ESD scenario generates a high
range of welfare changes. Of course, countries with high-income levels suffer
significant losses, while low-income countries benefit from generous allocations.
The acceptability of such a rule is, therefore, questionable and clearly not in line
to what the European Commission calls a “fair sharing of effort”; even though it
is difficult to define what is fair for the Commission as no welfare change by MSs
is reported in the impact-assessment report (European Commission, 2016). Note
that our simulations might overestimate the allocation sharing as we apply it to
all CO2 emissions and not only to non-ETS emissions. Thus, it is interesting to
compare this scenario with the one that corresponds to a uniform European CO2
tax in which the European Commission determines the level of the carbon price
with the aim of minimizing the aggregated European welfare loss. This scenario
is equivalent to an ETS market extended to all sectors, including households emis-
sions with no free allowance. This scenario penalizes mainly low-income MSs in
contrast to the previous scenario and demonstrates the need of emissions trading
to enforce the acceptability of EU climate targets. For Eastern European coun-
tries that joined the EU in 2004 or later, their welfare changes are mainly driven
by high abatement cost. Indeed, these MSs (e.g., Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania,
Poland, and Slovakia) are all characterized by high energy intensity compared to
MSs (Grossi and Mussini, 2017) that joined much earlier. Therefore, any carbon
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price implementation without a burden-sharing mechanism will inevitably penal-
ize these MSs.
We then combine these two scenarios with the goal to approximate the EU archi-
tecture that is based on an ETS market with a national target for other emissions
sources. First, we assume that flexibility mechanisms are implemented to link
the two markets (ETS and non-ETS). This assumption is in line with the impact
assessment report. In this case, we might have an equalization of CO2 prices be-
tween the two markets. Second, we define an allocation for each country that is
based on an effort-sharing rule for non-ETS emissions and full auctioning for the
ETS market. This allocation is approximated by a weighted combination of our
ESD allocations and the emissions computed in the equalization of the CO2 price
scenario as shown in (16),
θj =
γjθ
ESD
j Bud+(1−γj)
∑
t e
t TAX
j
ψ
Bud
, (16)
where γj is the share of emissions in non-ETS sectors, θESDj , the share computed
in the full ESD scenario, et TAXj , the emissions in the uniform tax scenario, and ψ a
normalization factor (equal to 1.04) that ensures that the sum of θj is equal to one.
The results of such burden-sharing is reported in table 2. This scenario, called
the EU architecture, reduces the variability of welfare changes while addressing
fairness concerns (Capros et al., 2011). This last point is illustrated in figure 4, in
which we plot welfare changes in respect to GDP per capita. High-income coun-
tries pay for low-income countries. Finally, we perform a scenario, called Welfare
equalization, that equalizes welfare change in % of household consumption. In
this Rawlsian (Rawls, 1971) approach to distributive justice, the “optimal design”
consists of finding the θj’s such that the welfare loss among the countries is equal-
ized. This scenario will be used as a benchmark scenario in the next section on
Brexit.
4.2. Brexit scenarios
We now assume, as described in section 2.2, that the UK fulfills its CO2
pledges individually through a domestic carbon price and does not participate
in the EU CO2 market. The UK budget, estimated at 13.7 Gt CO2, implies that
the UK would be able to implement a 20% and 80% reduction in CO2 emissions
by 2020 and 2050, respectively, from 1990 levels. We now simulate the four sce-
narios presented in the previous numerical section but with a game that excludes
the UK. This means we have to recompute a new set of θj for each scenarios, and
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Table 2: Discounted welfare cost as a % of total discounted household consumption
Welfare Full Uniform EU
equalization ESD tax architecture
Austria 1.17 3.31 0.14 2.26
Belgium 1.17 4.13 0.37 2.84
Bulgaria 1.17 -24.62 11.34 -1.44
Croatia 1.17 0.85 2.41 0.53
Cyprus 1.17 3.19 -1.44 0.77
Czech Republic 1.17 -18.79 7.97 -2.27
Denmark 1.17 2.50 -0.38 1.13
Estonia 1.17 -11.32 6.14 -2.05
Finland 1.17 2.70 1.56 1.74
France 1.17 2.94 0.42 2.20
Germany 1.17 1.42 0.74 0.83
Greece 1.17 -3.50 -1.12 -4.22
Hungary 1.17 -2.06 1.65 -1.24
Ireland 1.17 3.31 0.22 1.94
Italy 1.17 2.54 0.99 1.65
Latvia 1.17 -0.99 0.85 -1.30
Lithuania 1.17 -2.42 0.36 -2.19
Luxembourg 1.17 6.47 -1.66 4.90
Malta 1.17 2.73 0.18 0.68
Netherlands 1.17 3.29 -0.21 1.76
Poland 1.17 -14.36 9.55 -1.15
Portugal 1.17 -0.42 0.61 -0.49
Romania 1.17 -6.68 5.00 -1.03
Slovakia 1.17 -3.31 3.50 -1.00
Slovenia 1.17 0.68 2.38 0.76
Spain 1.17 0.63 1.26 0.45
Sweden 1.17 3.38 0.01 2.48
United Kingdom 1.17 2.12 1.39 1.57
European Union (28) 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17
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Figure 4: Welfare cost in relation to GDP per capita - EU architecture scenario (Luxembourg,
coordinate (85’600,4.9) is outside of the figure)
also to solve the model presented in section 2.2 for the UK climate policy. Table 3
shows the change in welfare cost with respect to the no-Brexit scenario. Within a
Brexit scenario and without any access to emission trading with the rest of EU, the
UK’s discounted welfare cost would be equal to 1.65% of its discounted house-
hold consumption. This means that with respect to all scenarios, except the full
effort-sharing decision rule, the UK suffers from an increase in the cost of its cli-
mate policy by leaving the EU. In comparison to the EU architecture scenario,
the discounted cost of the British climate policy increases by US$43 billion. In-
deed, in the EU architecture scenario, the UK receives some extra CO2 quotas
with respect to its domestic target (i.e., 13.8 Gt CO2 - 13.7 Gt CO2) and benefits
from less abatement cost by buying some European emissions credit. The Brexit
cost is exacerbated in the welfare equalization (US$260 billion) and uniform tax
(US$142 billion) scenarios because the UK bears a relatively high welfare cost
in comparison to the EU average. In contrast, in these two scenarios, all other
EU MSs are better off, simply because the average welfare cost decreases without
the UK. Within the EU architecture scenario, MSs that are net sellers of permits
suffer from less revenue and, in contrast, net buyers experience some benefits.
We now consider another situation in which the UK continues to participate in
16
Table 3: Absolute difference in discounted welfare cost (in percentage point: negative number
means a welfare improvement) for Brexit scenario
Welfare Full Uniform EU Third country
equalization ESD tax architecture status
Austria -0.11 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.01
Belgium -0.11 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.01
Bulgaria -0.11 1.20 -0.30 -0.01 -0.28
Croatia -0.11 0.20 -0.07 0.00 -0.04
Cyprus -0.11 0.22 -0.13 -0.04 -0.01
Czech Republic -0.11 0.91 -0.26 0.04 -0.18
Denmark -0.11 0.07 -0.05 -0.02 0.00
Estonia -0.11 0.77 -0.23 -0.02 -0.20
Finland -0.11 0.10 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03
France -0.11 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01
Germany -0.11 0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
Greece -0.11 0.33 -0.16 0.09 0.01
Hungary -0.11 0.21 -0.06 0.02 -0.04
Ireland -0.11 0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.01
Italy -0.11 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
Latvia -0.11 0.19 -0.06 0.04 -0.01
Lithuania -0.11 0.19 -0.07 0.03 -0.02
Luxembourg -0.11 0.01 -0.06 -0.07 0.06
Malta -0.11 0.18 -0.12 -0.07 -0.08
Netherlands -0.11 0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.01
Poland -0.11 0.81 -0.22 0.06 -0.16
Portugal -0.11 0.13 -0.04 0.01 -0.02
Slovakia -0.11 0.32 -0.10 0.04 -0.06
Slovenia -0.11 0.19 -0.08 -0.01 -0.04
Spain -0.11 0.13 -0.06 0.00 -0.02
Sweden -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.01
Romania -0.11 0.44 -0.11 0.03 -0.09
European Union (27) -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 0.00
United Kingdom 0.48 -0.47 0.26 0.08 0.06
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the European tradable market through as a third-country access status (Mu¨ller and
Slominski, 2016; Emerson, 2016; Pisani-Ferry et al., 2016), a similar status as the
one obtained by Norway or Liechtenstein in the existing EU ETS market. In this
scenario, called third country status, we assume that the budget allowed to the UK
is equal to 13.7 Gt CO2 (i.e., its domestic target), and the budget allowed to each
EU MS is equal to the one computed in the EU27 architecture scenario. Table 3
shows (last column) the welfare changes with respect to the EU28 architecture.
The UK would benefit from a third-access status with a Brexit cost reduced by
20% (shifting from 0.08% to 0.06%). This benefit is coming from the access
to emissions credit with low price in comparison to domestic abatement. For
European MSs net sellers benefit from more revenue coming from CO2 selling. In
contrast, net buyers experience welfare losses.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have evaluated the EU climate policy ratified at COP21, on
the 2050 horizon, in the context of the ESD proposed recently by the European
Commission (2016). Using a meta-game approach, we approximated the EU ar-
chitecture combining an ETS market with national binding commitments. We
have shown that ESD allows reaching an affordable and fair burden-sharing in
which, high-income MSs pay for low-income countries and, at the same time, en-
sure overall cost-efficiency. However, our analysis assumes that policy options
already defined in the EU proposal, such as one-off flexibility between ETS and
non-ETS and inter-temporal flexibility, are fully implemented.
The decision of the UK to leave the EU will no doubt impact European climate
policy. The UK played a pivotal role in EU climate policy and represents the
second-largest European emitter of GHG. The UK, Denmark, and Sweden belong
to the MSs that have implemented an ambitious climate policy for many years. A
possible exclusion of The UK from a EU CO2 market will, of course, have a direct
impact on the cost of European climate policy. Our first assessment shows that the
European countries could experience some welfare improvements, if one assumes
that the UK has to implement its emissions-reduction target through a domestic
carbon price and is not allowed to participate in any European instrument. On its
side, the UK could suffer a cost from not participating in the EU CO2 market, a
cost estimated by our model at US$43 billion within the EU architecture scenario.
If the UK could negotiate a status similar to Norway’s, then the Brexit cost would
be reduced by 20% (i.e., US$9 billion).
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These simulations assume that the EU ETS covers all sectors and not only
energy-intensive industries. Considering the current EU policy design, we can
argue that the non-participation of the UK in the existing EU ETS would penalize
mainly these industrial sectors for which the energy prices are a key factor of their
competitiveness. Of course, other sectors that are not included in the ETS would
also be affected because they are already integrated into the current effort-sharing
decision, but the impact would probably be less significant. However, new sectors
will certainly be included in the ETS market in the forthcoming decades because
increased flexibility between markets would lead to significant overall abatement
cost reduction, as pointed-out in the EC proposal (European Commission, 2016),
and the dichotomy between the two sectors would ultimately cease to exist.
Also, as in other economic affairs and international cooperations there is a
possibility for the UK to cooperate with the USA in creating or reinforcing bi-
lateral partnerships (Oliver and Williams, 2016), and, thus, mitigating this cost
increase. In any case, a possible exclusion of the UK from an EU CO2 mar-
ket would reinforce the leadership role of the EU founding MSs, in particular for
Germany (Oliver, 2016), which emits now about a quarter of aggregated EU GHG
emissions.
References
A roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050. Technical
report, European Commission, 2011a.
The 2012 ageing report: Underlying assumptions and projection methodologies.
Technical report, European Commission, 2011b.
Michael Anderson, Matt Juden, and Andrew Rogerson. After Brexit: New Oppor-
tunities for Global Good in the National Interest. Technical Report 089, Center
for Global Development, 2016.
Fre´de´ric Babonneau, Alain Haurie, and Marc Vielle. A Robust Meta-Game for
Climate Negotiations. Computational Management Science, 10(4):299–329,
2013.
Fre´de´ric Babonneau, Alain Haurie, and Marc Vielle. Assessment of balanced
burden-sharing in the 2050 EU climate/energy roadmap: a metamodeling ap-
proach. Climatic Change, 134(4):505–519, 2016.
19
Alain Bernard and Marc Vielle. Measuring the Welfare Cost of Climate Change
Policies: A Comparative Assessment Based on the Computable General Equi-
librium Model GEMINI-E3. Environmental Modeling & Assessment, 8(3):199–
217, 2003.
Christoph Bo¨hringer. Two Decades of European Climate Policy: A Critical Ap-
praisal. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 8(1):1–17, 2014.
Christoph Bo¨hringer, Thomas F. Rutherford, and Richard S.J. Tol. THE EU
20/20/2020 targets: An overview of the EMF22 assessment. Energy Economics,
31, Supplement 2:S268 – S273, 2009.
Pantelis Capros, Leonidas Mantzos, Leonidas Parousos, Nikolaos Tasios, Ger
Klaassen, and Tom Van Ierland. Analysis of the EU policy package on climate
change and renewables. Energy Policy, 39(3):1476 – 1485, 2011.
Lara Dahan, Katherine Rittenhouse, and Katie Kouchakji. The United Kingdom
: A case study on emissions trading. Technical report, International Emissions
Trading Association (IETA) and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), 2015.
Michael Emerson. Which model for Brexit? CEPS Special Report no. 147, Octo-
ber 2016.
European Commission. Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assess-
ment accompanying the document proposal for a regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on binding annual greenhouse gas emission re-
ductions by member states from 2021 to 2030 for a resilient energy union and
to meet commitments under the paris agreement and amending regulation no
525/2013 of the european parliament and the council on a mechanism for mon-
itoring and reporting greenhouse gas emissions and other information relevant
to climate change. Technical report, 2016.
Luigi Grossi and Mauro Mussini. Inequality in energy intensity in the EU-28.
Evidence from a new decomposition method. The Energy Journal, 38(4), 2017.
Alain Haurie, Fre´de´ric Babonneau, Neil Edwards, Phil Holden, Amit Kanudia,
Maryse Labriet, Marian Leimbach, Barbara Pizzileo, and Marc Vielle. Macroe-
conomics of Global Warming, chapter Fairness in Climate Negotiations: a
Meta-Game Analysis Based on Community Integrated Assessment. Oxford
Handbook, 2014.
20
Cameron Hepburn, Michael Grubb, Karsten Neuhoff, Felix Matthes, and Maxim-
ilien Tse. Auctioning of EU ETS phase II allowances: how and why? Climate
Policy, 6(1):137–160, 2006.
International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook 2013. 2013.
Rafal Kierzenkowski, Nigel Pain, Elena Rusticelli, and Sanne Zwart. The Eco-
nomic consequences of Brexit: A Taxing Decision. Technical report, OECD,
2016.
Brigitte Knopf, Yen-Heng Henry Chen, Enrica De Cian, Hannah Fo¨rster, Amit
Kanudia, Ioanna Karkatsouli, Ilkka Keppo, Tiina Koljonen, Katja Schumacher,
and Detlef P. Van Vuuren. Beyond 2020 - Strategies and costs for transform-
ing the European energy system. Climate Change Economics, 04(supp01):
1340001, 2013.
Anand Menon and John-Paul Salter. Brexit: initial reflections. International
Affairs, 92(6):1297–1318, 2016.
Patrick Mu¨ller and Peter Slominski. Theorizing third country agency in EU rule
transfer: linking the EU Emission Trading System with Norway, Switzerland
and Australia. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(6):814–832, 2016.
Tim Oliver. European and international views of Brexit. Journal of European
Public Policy, 23(9):1321–1328, 2016.
Tim Oliver and Michael John Williams. Special relationships in flux: Brexit and
the future of the US-EU and US-UK relationships. International Affairs, 92(3):
547–567, May 2016.
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Norbert Ro¨ttgen, Andre´ Sapir, Paul Tucker, and Guntram B
Wolff. Europe after Brexit: A proposal for a continental partnership. Bruegel
External Publication, Brussels, 2016.
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Leaving the EU: Implications for the UK economy,
March 2016.
Steve Pye, Nagore Sabio, and Neil Strachan. An integrated systematic analysis of
uncertainties in UK energy transition pathways. Energy Policy, 87:673 – 684,
2015.
21
John Rawls. Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, 1971.
Joeri Rogelj, Gunnar Luderer, Robert C. Pietzcker, Elmar Kriegler, Michiel Scha-
effer, Volker Krey, and Keywan Riahi. Energy system transformations for lim-
iting end-of-century warming to below 1.5°C. Nature Clim. Change, 5(6):519–
527, June 2015.
Andrew Scott. Brexit: implications for climate change commitments. Briefing
papers, Overseas Development Institute, 2016.
Stephen Smith and Joseph Swierzbinski. Assessing the performance of the UK
Emissions Trading Scheme. Environmental and Resource Economics, 37(1):
131–158, 2007.
Richard S.J. Tol. Intra-union flexibility of non-ETS emission reduction obliga-
tions in the European Union. Energy Policy, 37(5):1745 – 1752, 2009.
United Kingdom Government. Climate Change Act. Technical report, 2008.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Aggregate effect of
the intended nationally determined contributions: an update. Synthesis report
by the secretariat. Technical report, 2016a.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Greenhouse gas in-
ventory data, 2016b.
Frank Venmans. A literature-based multi-criteria evaluation of the EU ETS. Re-
newable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 16(8):5493 – 5510, 2012.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Laurent Drouet and Frank Vo¨hringer for their com-
ments and suggestions. The first two authors are supported by the Qatar National
Research Fund under Grant Agreement no 6-1035-5–126.
22
Appendix A Scenario detailed results
We report in the following two appendices detailed result of the ESD and
Brexit scenarios described and discussed in the core of the paper. For each sce-
nario, tables give the following information: θj , the budget allocated to each MS
in Mt of CO2 (i.e. θj· Bud), the welfare cost in percentage of discounted house-
hold consumption (HC) and its decomposition between abatement cost, GTT and
permits exchange. More information are available upon request.
A.1 Results of EU28 scenarios
The following scenarios are discussed in Section 4.1.
A.1.1 Welfare equalization
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Budget Welfare cost Welfare decomposition in % of HC
θj in Mt CO2 in % of HC Abatement cost GTT CO2 trading
AUT 0.018 1803 1.17 1.35 -1.20 1.03
BEL 0.032 3208 1.17 1.68 -1.31 0.80
CYP 0.004 411 1.17 5.58 -7.03 2.62
CZE 0.014 1361 1.17 9.76 -1.82 -6.77
DNK 0.018 1810 1.17 2.14 -2.53 1.56
EST 0.004 392 1.17 9.37 -3.25 -4.95
FIN 0.015 1475 1.17 2.25 -0.69 -0.39
FRA 0.122 12097 1.17 1.10 -0.68 0.75
DEU 0.140 13859 1.17 1.57 -0.83 0.43
GRC 0.051 5006 1.17 6.63 -7.76 2.30
HUN 0.013 1268 1.17 2.48 -0.84 -0.48
IRL 0.014 1409 1.17 2.39 -2.17 0.95
ITA 0.118 11647 1.17 1.44 -0.45 0.18
LAT 0.003 297 1.17 2.40 -1.56 0.33
LIT 0.003 299 1.17 2.28 -1.93 0.82
LUX 0.006 549 1.17 2.46 -4.13 2.83
MLT 0.001 131 1.17 4.39 -4.23 1.01
NLD 0.043 4291 1.17 1.77 -1.98 1.38
POL 0.062 6120 1.17 8.86 0.67 -8.36
POR 0.015 1466 1.17 1.63 -1.02 0.56
SVK 0.008 825 1.17 3.84 -0.34 -2.33
SVN 0.005 450 1.17 3.03 -0.66 -1.20
SPN 0.090 8894 1.17 2.03 -0.77 -0.09
SWE 0.017 1648 1.17 0.59 -0.58 1.16
GBR 0.149 14730 1.17 1.55 -0.16 -0.22
BGR 0.008 815 1.17 11.61 -0.29 -10.15
ROU 0.019 1900 1.17 4.33 0.66 -3.82
HRV 0.008 839 1.17 2.66 -0.25 -1.24
EU28 1.000 99000 1.17
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A.1.2 Full ESD
Budget Welfare cost Welfare decomposition in % of HC
θj in Mt CO2 in % of HC Abatement cost GTT CO2 trading
AUT 0.013 1299 3.31 1.35 -1.20 3.17
BEL 0.023 2249 4.13 1.68 -1.31 3.76
CYP 0.004 381 3.19 5.58 -7.03 4.64
CZE 0.034 3335 -18.79 9.76 -1.82 -26.73
DNK 0.016 1558 2.50 2.14 -2.53 2.89
EST 0.006 571 -11.32 9.37 -3.25 -17.44
FIN 0.012 1232 2.70 2.25 -0.69 1.14
FRA 0.090 8914 2.94 1.10 -0.68 2.52
DEU 0.135 13327 1.42 1.57 -0.83 0.67
GRC 0.062 6166 -3.50 6.63 -7.76 -2.37
HUN 0.016 1627 -2.06 2.48 -0.84 -3.70
IRL 0.011 1122 3.31 2.39 -2.17 3.09
ITA 0.098 9657 2.54 1.44 -0.45 1.54
LAT 0.003 343 -0.99 2.40 -1.56 -1.84
LIT 0.004 412 -2.42 2.28 -1.93 -2.77
LUX 0.004 371 6.47 2.46 -4.13 8.14
MLT 0.001 122 2.73 4.39 -4.23 2.56
NLD 0.034 3385 3.29 1.77 -1.98 3.50
POL 0.113 11187 -14.36 8.86 0.67 -23.89
POR 0.018 1743 -0.42 1.63 -1.02 -1.02
SVK 0.011 1092 -3.31 3.84 -0.34 -6.81
SVN 0.005 466 0.68 3.03 -0.66 -1.69
SPN 0.095 9414 0.63 2.03 -0.77 -0.63
SWE 0.011 1045 3.38 0.59 -0.58 3.37
GBR 0.127 12592 2.12 1.55 -0.16 0.73
BGR 0.016 1609 -24.62 11.61 -0.29 -35.93
ROU 0.030 2925 -6.68 4.33 0.66 -11.67
HRV 0.009 853 0.85 2.66 -0.25 -1.56
EU28 1.000 99000 1.17
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A.1.3 Uniform tax
Budget Welfare cost Welfare decomposition in % of HC
θj in Mt CO2 in % of HC Abatement cost GTT CO2 trading
AUT 0.021 2045 0.14 1.35 -1.20 –
BEL 0.035 3468 0.37 1.67 -1.31 –
CYP 0.005 450 -1.44 5.57 -7.02 –
CZE 0.007 689 7.97 9.78 -1.81 –
DNK 0.021 2104 -0.38 2.14 -2.52 –
EST 0.003 321 6.14 9.39 -3.24 –
FIN 0.014 1413 1.56 2.25 -0.69 –
FRA 0.136 13455 0.42 1.09 -0.68 –
DEU 0.149 14780 0.74 1.57 -0.83 –
GRC 0.056 5579 -1.12 6.63 -7.74 –
HUN 0.012 1216 1.65 2.48 -0.84 –
IRL 0.016 1537 0.22 2.39 -2.17 –
ITA 0.120 11906 0.99 1.44 -0.44 –
LAT 0.003 304 0.85 2.40 -1.55 –
LIT 0.003 325 0.36 2.28 -1.92 –
LUX 0.007 644 -1.66 2.46 -4.12 –
MLT 0.001 137 0.18 4.39 -4.22 –
NLD 0.049 4881 -0.21 1.77 -1.97 –
POL 0.034 3386 9.55 8.88 0.67 –
POR 0.016 1564 0.61 1.63 -1.02 –
SVK 0.007 686 3.50 3.85 -0.34 –
SVN 0.004 412 2.38 3.03 -0.66 –
SPN 0.089 8807 1.26 2.03 -0.77 –
SWE 0.020 1966 0.01 0.59 -0.58 –
GBR 0.144 14241 1.39 1.55 -0.16 –
BGR 0.005 502 11.34 11.64 -0.29 –
ROU 0.014 1400 5.00 4.34 0.66 –
HRV 0.008 782 2.41 2.66 -0.25 –
EU28 1.000 99000 1.17
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A.1.4 EU architecture
Budget Welfare cost Welfare decomposition in % of HC
θj in Mt CO2 in % of HC Abatement cost GTT CO2 trading
AUT 0.016 1547 2.26 1.35 -1.20 2.12
BEL 0.027 2667 2.84 1.68 -1.31 2.47
CYP 0.004 417 0.77 5.58 -7.03 2.23
CZE 0.017 1701 -2.27 9.76 -1.82 -10.21
DNK 0.018 1817 1.13 2.14 -2.53 1.52
EST 0.004 438 -2.05 9.37 -3.25 -8.17
FIN 0.014 1384 1.74 2.25 -0.69 0.18
FRA 0.103 10244 2.20 1.10 -0.68 1.78
DEU 0.147 14599 0.83 1.57 -0.83 0.08
GRC 0.064 6344 -4.22 6.63 -7.76 -3.09
HUN 0.016 1536 -1.24 2.48 -0.84 -2.89
IRL 0.013 1305 1.94 2.39 -2.17 1.72
ITA 0.110 10939 1.65 1.44 -0.45 0.66
LAT 0.004 349 -1.30 2.40 -1.56 -2.14
LIT 0.004 405 -2.19 2.28 -1.93 -2.54
LUX 0.004 423 4.90 2.46 -4.13 6.57
MLT 0.001 134 0.68 4.39 -4.23 0.52
NLD 0.041 4040 1.76 1.77 -1.98 1.97
POL 0.069 6875 -1.15 8.86 0.67 -10.67
POR 0.018 1755 -0.49 1.63 -1.02 -1.09
SVK 0.010 954 -1.00 3.84 -0.34 -4.50
SVN 0.005 464 0.76 3.03 -0.66 -1.61
SPN 0.097 9591 0.45 2.03 -0.77 -0.81
SWE 0.013 1289 2.48 0.59 -0.58 2.48
GBR 0.140 13832 1.57 1.55 -0.16 0.18
BGR 0.009 896 -1.44 11.61 -0.29 -12.75
ROU 0.022 2187 -1.03 4.33 0.66 -6.02
HRV 0.009 868 0.53 2.66 -0.25 -1.88
EU28 1.000 99000 1.17
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A.2 Results of Brexit scenarios
These scenarios are discussed in Section 4.2.
A.2.1 Welfare equalization
Budget Welfare cost Welfare decomposition in % of HC
θj in Mt CO2 in % of HC Abatement cost GTT CO2 trading
AUT 0.021 1825 1.06 1.31 -1.20 0.95
BEL 0.038 3238 1.06 1.63 -1.31 0.74
CYP 0.005 412 1.06 5.45 -7.01 2.63
CZE 0.016 1386 1.06 9.50 -1.81 -6.62
DNK 0.021 1825 1.06 2.09 -2.52 1.50
EST 0.005 395 1.06 9.14 -3.24 -4.84
FIN 0.018 1494 1.06 2.20 -0.69 -0.44
FRA 0.144 12265 1.06 1.07 -0.68 0.68
DEU 0.165 14076 1.06 1.53 -0.83 0.36
GRC 0.059 5025 1.06 6.47 -7.75 2.33
HUN 0.015 1282 1.06 2.42 -0.84 -0.52
IRL 0.017 1422 1.06 2.33 -2.17 0.90
ITA 0.138 11800 1.06 1.40 -0.44 0.11
LAT 0.004 299 1.06 2.34 -1.56 0.27
LIT 0.004 302 1.06 2.21 -1.92 0.77
LUX 0.006 551 1.06 2.41 -4.11 2.77
MLT 0.002 132 1.06 4.27 -4.21 1.01
NLD 0.051 4327 1.06 1.72 -1.97 1.31
POL 0.073 6212 1.06 8.64 0.66 -8.24
POR 0.017 1483 1.06 1.58 -1.02 0.50
SVK 0.010 834 1.06 3.74 -0.34 -2.34
SVN 0.005 455 1.06 2.95 -0.66 -1.24
SPN 0.106 9002 1.06 1.97 -0.77 -0.14
SWE 0.020 1672 1.06 0.57 -0.58 1.07
BGR 0.010 825 1.06 11.30 -0.29 -9.95
ROU 0.023 1924 1.06 4.22 0.66 -3.81
HRV 0.010 845 1.06 2.59 -0.25 -1.28
EU27 1.000 85307 1.06
GBR 13693 1.65 1.81 -0.16 –
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A.2.2 Full ESD
Budget Welfare cost Welfare decomposition in % of HC
θj in Mt CO2 in % of HC Abatement cost GTT CO2 trading
AUT 0.015 1279 3.33 1.31 -1.20 3.22
BEL 0.026 2214 4.16 1.63 -1.31 3.83
CYP 0.004 377 3.40 5.45 -7.01 4.97
CZE 0.039 3301 -17.88 9.50 -1.81 -25.57
DNK 0.018 1533 2.57 2.09 -2.52 3.01
EST 0.007 565 -10.54 9.14 -3.24 -16.44
FIN 0.014 1212 2.80 2.20 -0.69 1.29
FRA 0.103 8781 2.96 1.07 -0.68 2.57
DEU 0.154 13120 1.50 1.53 -0.83 0.80
GRC 0.072 6100 -3.18 6.47 -7.75 -1.91
HUN 0.019 1612 -1.85 2.42 -0.84 -3.43
IRL 0.013 1104 3.38 2.33 -2.17 3.22
ITA 0.112 9528 2.59 1.40 -0.44 1.64
LAT 0.004 340 -0.80 2.34 -1.56 -1.59
LIT 0.005 408 -2.23 2.21 -1.92 -2.52
LUX 0.004 365 6.49 2.41 -4.11 8.19
MLT 0.001 121 2.91 4.27 -4.21 2.85
NLD 0.039 3331 3.35 1.72 -1.97 3.60
POL 0.130 11083 -13.55 8.64 0.66 -22.85
POR 0.020 1724 -0.29 1.58 -1.02 -0.85
SVK 0.013 1081 -2.99 3.74 -0.34 -6.39
SVN 0.005 461 0.87 2.95 -0.66 -1.42
SPN 0.109 9300 0.76 1.97 -0.77 -0.44
SWE 0.012 1029 3.37 0.57 -0.58 3.38
BGR 0.019 1595 -23.42 11.30 -0.29 -34.43
ROU 0.034 2899 -6.25 4.22 0.66 -11.12
HRV 0.010 845 1.05 2.59 -0.25 -1.29
EU27 1.000 85307 1.06
GBR 13693 1.65 1.81 -0.16 –
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A.2.3 Uniform tax
Budget Welfare cost Welfare decomposition in % of HC
θj in Mt CO2 in % of HC Abatement cost GTT CO2 trading
AUT 0.024 2053 0.11 1.31 -1.20 –
BEL 0.041 3483 0.32 1.63 -1.31 –
CYP 0.005 452 -1.57 5.44 -7.02 –
CZE 0.008 715 7.71 9.52 -1.81 –
DNK 0.025 2114 -0.43 2.08 -2.52 –
EST 0.004 324 5.91 9.16 -3.24 –
FIN 0.017 1422 1.51 2.20 -0.69 –
FRA 0.158 13513 0.38 1.06 -0.68 –
DEU 0.174 14878 0.70 1.53 -0.83 –
GRC 0.066 5618 -1.28 6.47 -7.74 –
HUN 0.014 1223 1.58 2.42 -0.84 –
IRL 0.018 1546 0.16 2.33 -2.17 –
ITA 0.140 11967 0.95 1.39 -0.44 –
LAT 0.004 305 0.79 2.34 -1.55 –
LIT 0.004 327 0.29 2.21 -1.92 –
LUX 0.008 646 -1.71 2.40 -4.12 –
MLT 0.002 138 0.06 4.27 -4.22 –
NLD 0.057 4900 -0.25 1.72 -1.97 –
POL 0.041 3459 9.32 8.66 0.67 –
POR 0.018 1572 0.56 1.58 -1.02 –
SVK 0.008 692 3.40 3.75 -0.34 –
SVN 0.005 414 2.30 2.96 -0.66 –
SPN 0.104 8864 1.20 1.97 -0.77 –
SWE 0.023 1971 -0.01 0.57 -0.58 –
BGR 0.006 512 11.04 11.33 -0.29 –
ROU 0.017 1415 4.89 4.23 0.66 –
HRV 0.009 786 2.34 2.59 -0.25 –
EU27 1.000 85307 1.06
GBR 13693 1.65 1.81 -0.16 –
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A.2.4 EU architecture
Budget Welfare cost Welfare decomposition in % of HC
θj in Mt CO2 in % of HC Abatement cost GTT CO2 trading
AUT 0.018 1544 2.23 1.31 -1.20 2.12
BEL 0.031 2663 2.80 1.63 -1.31 2.48
CYP 0.005 417 0.73 5.45 -7.01 2.30
CZE 0.020 1718 -2.22 9.50 -1.81 -9.91
DNK 0.021 1816 1.11 2.09 -2.52 1.54
EST 0.005 441 -2.07 9.14 -3.24 -7.97
FIN 0.016 1389 1.71 2.20 -0.69 0.21
FRA 0.120 10221 2.17 1.07 -0.68 1.79
DEU 0.171 14627 0.81 1.53 -0.83 0.11
GRC 0.074 6342 -4.13 6.47 -7.75 -2.86
HUN 0.018 1541 -1.22 2.42 -0.84 -2.80
IRL 0.015 1304 1.92 2.33 -2.17 1.75
ITA 0.128 10955 1.63 1.40 -0.44 0.68
LAT 0.004 350 -1.26 2.34 -1.56 -2.05
LIT 0.005 405 -2.15 2.21 -1.92 -2.45
LUX 0.005 421 4.83 2.41 -4.11 6.54
MLT 0.002 135 0.61 4.27 -4.21 0.56
NLD 0.047 4037 1.73 1.72 -1.97 1.98
POL 0.081 6927 -1.08 8.64 0.66 -10.39
POR 0.021 1759 -0.48 1.58 -1.02 -1.05
SVK 0.011 958 -0.96 3.74 -0.34 -4.36
SVN 0.005 465 0.75 2.95 -0.66 -1.55
SPN 0.113 9612 0.44 1.97 -0.77 -0.76
SWE 0.015 1285 2.45 0.57 -0.58 2.46
BGR 0.011 904 -1.45 11.30 -0.29 -12.46
ROU 0.026 2200 -1.00 4.22 0.66 -5.88
HRV 0.010 870 0.53 2.59 -0.25 -1.81
EU27 1.000 85307 1.06
GBR 13693 1.65 1.81 -0.16 –
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A.2.5 Third country status
Budget Welfare cost Welfare decomposition in % of HC
θj in Mt CO2 in % of HC Abatement cost GTT CO2 trading
AUT 0.016 1544 2.27 1.35 -1.20 2.13
BEL 0.027 2663 2.85 1.68 -1.31 2.48
CYP 0.004 417 0.76 5.58 -7.03 2.22
CZE 0.017 1718 -2.44 9.76 -1.82 -10.38
DNK 0.018 1816 1.13 2.14 -2.53 1.52
EST 0.004 441 -2.25 9.37 -3.25 -8.37
FIN 0.014 1389 1.72 2.25 -0.69 0.16
FRA 0.103 10221 2.21 1.10 -0.68 1.79
DEU 0.148 14627 0.81 1.57 -0.83 0.07
GRC 0.064 6342 -4.21 6.63 -7.76 -3.08
HUN 0.016 1541 -1.28 2.48 -0.84 -2.93
IRL 0.013 1304 1.95 2.39 -2.17 1.73
ITA 0.111 10955 1.64 1.44 -0.45 0.65
LAT 0.004 350 -1.31 2.40 -1.56 -2.15
LIT 0.004 405 -2.21 2.28 -1.93 -2.57
LUX 0.004 421 4.96 2.46 -4.13 6.62
MLT 0.001 135 0.61 4.39 -4.23 0.45
NLD 0.041 4037 1.76 1.77 -1.98 1.97
POL 0.070 6927 -1.31 8.86 0.67 -10.83
POR 0.018 1759 -0.51 1.63 -1.02 -1.11
SVK 0.010 958 -1.06 3.84 -0.34 -4.56
SVN 0.005 465 0.71 3.03 -0.66 -1.66
SPN 0.097 9612 0.43 2.03 -0.77 -0.83
SWE 0.013 1285 2.50 0.59 -0.58 2.49
BGR 0.009 904 -1.72 11.61 -0.29 -13.03
ROU 0.022 2200 -1.13 4.33 0.66 -6.12
HRV 0.009 870 0.49 2.66 -0.25 -1.93
EU27 0.862 85307 1.06
GBR 0.138 13693 1.63 1.55 -0.16 0.24
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